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Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2

15 April 1959

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. **28**
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
FULLY CLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: **2010**

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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC




USSR-Poland: Commenting on the recent party congress in Warsaw, [redacted]

[redacted] stated that Khrushchev's grudging endorsement of both Gomulka and Poland's special brand of Communism is, in time, bound to have an impact on Communists throughout the world. Moscow may be faced eventually with the alternative of crushing Gomulka or permitting other satellites the same degree of autonomy as Poland, which would weaken Soviet control.



Communist China - Tibet - India: Peiping's statements and dealings with India have been increasingly cautious since the Tibet revolt started last month. Communist China has thus far made no formal protest concerning Indian Government statements critical of the Communist handling of the revolt. Reflecting this policy, [redacted]



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**III. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION**

[The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions were to be used in context with SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that estimate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959):]

[1. Evidence of preparations for evacuation of Soviet control elements from Berlin continues to mount. While the USSR will not turn over access controls to the GDR in the near future, the physical transfer of access controls could be accomplished with little or no advance warning.]

[2. There are no reliable indications of a bloc intent in the near future to blockade Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin from the bloc. However, the USSR could take such actions with little or no warning. The recent completion of new facilities at the Marienborn checkpoint suggests that the East Germans may impose tighter controls on railroad traffic between West Germany and Berlin.]

OK [3. There are as yet no clear indications of specific Soviet tactics at the forthcoming foreign ministers' meeting in Geneva. Moscow is using propaganda media and covert channels to play down East-West tensions and attempt to soften Western positions on the basic issues involved.]

[4. It is still too early to determine what effect, if any, Chancellor Adenauer's decision to seek the presidency will have on Bonn's foreign policy.]

[5. Tension throughout West Berlin has noticeably abated and the upward trend of the stock market is a significant indicator of confidence. There is still considerable apprehension about the confusion surrounding international debate on Berlin and all-German problems. Most West Berlin political leaders prefer the status quo despite its weaknesses to any compromise.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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25X1 [redacted] 1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Possible Impact on the Bloc of Khrushchev's Endorsement
Of Gomulka

25X1 [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] Khrushchev's grudging endorsement of
Gomulka and Poland's own special brand of Communism is
bound in time to have its impact on the Communist world. In
the long run, Moscow may be faced with the alternatives of
having to crush Gomulka or of permitting certain other satel-
lites a degree of autonomy which would weaken its control.

25X1 [redacted] The truce between Khrushchev and Gomulka is based on
mutual necessity, [redacted] As a Commu-
nist, Gomulka, in the final analysis, can look only to Moscow
for support and dares not defy the USSR openly. On the other
hand, trouble in Poland could mean only trouble for Khrushchev,
who does not want to risk another Hungary while he is so deeply
involved in important international political maneuverings.

25X1 [redacted] Concern over the possible effect of the outcome of the Ber-
lin crisis on Poland's unique position in the bloc has been ex-
pressed [redacted]

[redacted] feels that if the United States
makes too many concessions to the Soviet Union in the current
crisis over Berlin, the USSR would regard its dominance in East-
ern Europe as assured and would no longer feel it necessary to
tolerate the Polish differences. As long as there is some un-
certainty in the USSR about the American attitude toward East-
ern Europe, it will maintain the status quo in Poland and in some
of the other countries.

25X1 [redacted] Currently many Poles, including Gomulka, [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] are concerned that the Soviet Union, despite Khru-
shchev's assurances to the contrary, will make "territorial ad-
justments," stripping Poland of its highly prized western territo-
ries in order to effect a German settlement. While Poland would
prefer the Oder-Neisse border to be established for good, it fears
the possible results of negotiations over Germany and will settle
for a continuation of the status quo. [redacted] 25X1

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